While peace talks between Syria’s government and opposition entered into deadlock in Geneva, battles rage on the ground, and the death toll and the refugee wave rise. Europe wanted its voice to be heard in the talks, but can it keep its eyes — and borders — closed to the men, women and children fleeing Syria? How can Europe better respond to the human and political disaster looming on its external border?
On 3 October 2013, 366 migrants drowned when their boat sank less than a mile off the shore of the Italian island of Lampedusa. A number of questions must be addressed in finding the best policy response to this tragedy. Was it the sign of a new trend in irregular migration to the EU; or was it a sign of increased risks associated with smuggling? Do smuggled migrants resemble regular asylum seekers and migrants or do they represent a specific group? In other words do the Lampedusa events call for a drastic revision of EU asylum and migration policy or an ad hoc response?
This report covers migration in 18 EU neighbouring countries, including: Algeria; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Egypt; Georgia; Jordan; Lebanon; Libya; Mauritania; Moldova; Morocco; Palestine; Russia; Syria; Tunisia; Turkey and Ukraine. Each country report provides the most recent and up-to-date data and analysis on demographic, legal, and socio-political aspects of both inward and outward migration stocks and flows.
This paper measures both population ageing and shrinking within the working age populations of all 27 European Union countries between 2010 and 2025, in the absence of any further migration. In this ‘no migration scenario’ it provides the levels of net migration that should be necessary to maintain the size of the young working age population (aged 15-44 years of age). This paper does not give analytic focus to wider non-demographic processes that can either offset or amplify the ageing of skills. For example, neither the introduction of life-long learning programmes nor the postponements to the legal age of retirement are factored into the model. Results highlight that without migrants shows the employed population aged below 45 in all EU member states will have significant levels of shortfall in maintaining the size of the 2010 labour force.
Although over 450,000 Syrians fled to countries nearby Syria, numbers seeking refuge within the EU remain small. In 2011, a total of 8,920 Syrians applied for asylum within EU borders, while in the first three quarters of 2012 applications increased slightly, reaching a total of 11,573. Only 1,490 irregular entries of Syrians were recorded during the last three quarters of 2011, which rose to 2,739 in the first two quarters of 2012. Numbers of Syrians applying for immigration have also remained negligible. In light of the overall magnitude of the crisis compared with the actual numbers reaching Europe, this paper reviews EU’s response to the crisis. First, it presents the facts: a historical review of displacements from Syria, the numbers, and the route of travel for Syrian refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers to Europe. This is followed by a review of European responses to the Syrian crisis. Finally, the paper concludes with recommendations for addressing the Syrian refugee crisis. In short, the EU could consider: establishing a Regional Protection Programme (RPP) with a large increase of Syrian refugee resettlement as a required component; increasing refugee resettlement for those who have been affected by the Syrian crisis and are the most in need; continue positive asylum procedures throughout the EU, and grant prima facie recognition including provision of sufficient assistance to Syrian asylum seekers; encourage visa facilitation and family reunification for Syrians; and continue to work with its international partners to find a political and humanitarian solution to the Syrian crisis.
This paper provides a statistical assessment of migration before and after the uprisings in the Southern Mediterranean. It will review European and Arab state policies regarding migration and will ultimately encourage the factoring of the outcomes of the Arab Spring within migration policies on both shores of the Mediterranean. The assessment is based upon the most recent statistical data gathered directly from the competent offices in European Member States; from policy documents emanating from the European Union and concerned States; and from first-hand accounts from surveys conducted in Spring 2012 by scholars in six Arab countries (within Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon) in collaboration with the Migration Policy Centre (MPC). Notably, migration to Europe has not been accelerated by the Arab Spring, apart from a short-lived movement from Tunisia, but has simply continued along previous trends. In sharp contrast, migration within the Southern Mediterranean has been deeply impacted by the events as outflows of migrants and refugees fled instability and violence in Libya and Syria.
The book is the output of the project on ‘The Mediterranean Microcosm in the Broader Relationship Between the West and the Arab-Muslim World’ conducted by IAI in cooperation with the Center for the US and Europe (CUSE) of the Brookings Institution, in Washington and the Robert Schuman Centre (RSC) of the European University Institute (EUI), in Florence.
In the final report of the project “Improving EU and US Immigration Systems’ Capacity for Responding to Global Challenges: Learning from experiences”, Shared Challenges and Opportunities for EU and US Immigration Policymakers, authors Philippe Fargues, Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Giambattista Salinari, and Madeleine Sumption summarize and reflect upon the key findings of the project’s research papers and policy briefs. The report highlights the lessons to be learned from both similar and divergent experiences on either side of the Atlantic, sketching opportunities for future reform, as well as ways in which the European Union and the United States could improve their cooperative relationship. This review took place within the context of substantial uncertainties arising from the economic, jobs, and fiscal crises and, in the case of Europe, from political upheaval in the Arab world. It must also be seen in the context of ongoing institutional, economic, and demographic changes, as well as governments’ growing recognition that deeper cooperation with both sending and receiving countries are crucial to the effective management of migration.
Demography challenges Europe in three ways: 1) Europe’s size: while the population of Europe will decrease or stabilise, depending upon migration scenarios, most other regions will continue to increase so that the relative weight of Europe in world population terms will dwindle, thereby endangering Europe’s weight in world affairs and the institutions of global governance; 2) Europe’s wealth: the European workforce is about to enter a period of fast decline that might hamper Europe’s ambitious economic goals; 3) Europe’s social contract: the unprecedented rise of an elderly population combined with shrinking numbers of working-age natives alters the generational contract and will put Europe’s welfare systems at risk. In order to curb negative population trends, Europe can have recourse to various strategies, each of them having though only a partial potential impact on the above challenges: 1) Geographic enlargement: including new countries in the European Union (EU) brings at once additional populations to the Union; 2) Pro-natalist policies: if successful, they would foster a higher birth rate which translates 20 years later into a corresponding increase in the working-age population; 3) Immigration policies: calling in immigrants would affect both the size and the structure of the population; 4) Retirement policies: changing the age limit between economic activity and retirement is a way to address problems brought about by demographic numbers without changing the numbers themselves; 5) Other policies, notably those on education and labour, can also contribute to addressing, albeit indirectly, some of the problems generated by a decreasing workforce.
Migrants represent between one-third and four-fifths of the population in the Gulf States. Despite their sizable numbers, migrants can only have temporary residency, they have no access to citizenship, and they have limited membership in society, conditions which are unique to the Gulf States as destination countries. The first section argues that non-nationals have been instrumental in shaping the social link between nationals, and the relationship between them and their rulers. The second section shows how oil-generated wealth has allowed demographic growth through high fertility among nationals, and high immigration among non-nationals through high immigration. The faster growth among non-nationals has produced societies with a continuously shrinking proportion of nationals. Indeed, while policies of not allowing immigrants’ integration in the citizenry have worked well, policies aiming at reducing dependency on foreign workers through indigenizing the workforce and those limiting their duration of stay have not been successful. The exceptional demography of the Gulf States is not explained by an exceptional level of immigration as much as by an exceptional closure of local societies.
The main objective of this Study is to analyze the key labour market determinants of migration flows from selected Arab Mediterranean Countries (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and the Occupied Palestinian Territories) and the impact of outward migration on the labour markets of Arab Mediterranean Countries (AMCs). This has been done mainly on the basis of the evidence and analysis produced by the two Thematic Background Papers and the 8 National Background Papers commissioned for the Study. In turn, the National Background Papers are deliberately based on national statistical data sources: this makes comparability less straightforward, but has the merit of using original data available at the local level, where they are collected and generated.
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries have recently turned into receivers of migrants, but they have neither the institutions nor the policies that would allow them to integrate migrants. Therefore, most migrants in SEM countries found themselves in irregular situation. Using a variety of statistical sources, official and non-official, the article establishes that out of 5.6 million immigrants living in SEM countries in the mid-2000s, a minimum of 3.6 would be in irregular situation. They belong to three categories: approximately 2 million migrant workers attracted by SEM labour markets where they are employed in the informal sector with no work permit, 1.5 million de facto refugees who cannot obtain the status of refugee and are waiting for resettlement in a third country or return to their homes, and less than 200,000 transit migrants initially bound for Europe, which they are unable to reach for lack of visa. While their reasons to be stranded in the SEM differ, these three categories share the same vulnerable conditions, with no legal access to work, services, or protection.
La situation migratoire autour de la Méditerranée est largement conditionnée par la proximité de l’Union européenne (UE). L’UE est désormais la première région d’immigration du monde(1). Par le simple fait de leur adhésion et de la richesse qu’elle crée, ses États membres se sont transformés les uns après les autres en pays d’immigration(2). L’attraction s’exerce d’abord sur sa périphérie, si bien que tous ses voisins – sauf la Norvège – ont un solde migratoire négatif avec elle. Cela est vrai des pays accédants (Bulgarie et Roumanie), des pays candidats (Croatie, Macédoine et Turquie), comme des simples pays tiers : la Russie (qui a un solde migratoire positif avec les anciens États de l’URSS, mais négatif avec le reste du monde dont l’UE)(3), l’Ukraine, la Biélorussie, et les pays de la rive sud de la Méditerranée(4). Ces développements sont en général mis en relation avec trois faits : la pression des pays pauvres du Sud en forte croissance démographique, la demande de travail des pays riches du Nord ou du golfe Persique et la baisse tendancielle du coût de transport. Comme nous le verrons, le premier élément doit être relativisé, le second et le troisième, au contraire, dessinent les grandes lignes d’une nouvelle forme de migration qui changera sans doute les rapports entre les nations.
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries have become receivers of international migrants without the instruments and policies for integrating them. As a result, irregular migration has grown faster that regular migration. The paper establishes that the SEM currently hosts more than 3.6 million irregular migrants: irregular labour migrants targeting local labour markets are the largest category, followed by unrecognised refugees waiting for return or resettlement, then, in much smaller numbers, by transit migrants waiting for a passage to Europe. Regardless the different reasons behind migration, these three categories tend to merge into one group of population that has no legal access to labour, welfare and protection, that acts as a regulator of labour markets while escaping governments’ control.
Emigration from Iraq has been occurring since the 1970s. The Iran-Iraq War, Gulf War and the subsequent international sanctions placed on the Iraqi regime have all produced waves of emigration. After US occupation of Iraq, however, and particularly since 2005, the country has witnessed unprecedented levels of out-migration. Since the US led war on Iraq in 2003, massive numbers of Iraqis have been displaced from their homes causing the largest influx of refugees into the region. The situation of Iraqi refugees in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon has received the attention of academics. In comparison, the picture of Iraqis in Egypt has remained obscure. This report sheds light on the situation of Iraqis living in Egypt. It answers questions related to numbers of Iraqis, reasons for choosing Egypt, patterns of flight, and the current situation and social networks of this population.