3

Demography and international migration

Philippe Fargues

Demography is the science of population growth and structure. The growth of any population is determined by entries and exits and its structure depends on the distribution by age and sex, as well as a few other characteristics. Formal, mathematical demography was established for closed populations, ones that would be exclusively entered by birth and exited by death (Lotka 1939; Bourgeois-Pichat 1968). Migration had no place in demographic models and theories until the 1960s (Keyfitz 1968, 1971). As soon as a population is defined by a territory, however, entries and exits must combine natural movements (births and deaths) with migratory movements (inward and outward mobility). When the territory is that of a country (or a 'nation'), then international migration becomes relevant to demography.

This chapter will review, in turn: the place of international migration in population growth in general terms; international migration and the demographic transition in less developed regions; and high immigration combined with low fertility in the post-transitional demography of the most advanced countries.

The place of international migration in population growth

The basic equation of population growth between times 0 and 1 is:

$$P1 - P0 = (B - D) + (I - E)$$

Where P is the total population and B, D, I and E are respectively the numbers of births, deaths, arrivals (I for immigration) and departures (E for emigration); (B − D) is natural population increase and (I − E) net migration.

For the purpose of measuring migration flows, the United Nations define an international migrant as 'any person who changes his or her country of usual residence' (United Nations 1998: 17).[1] Admitting that at any moment in time one person has only one country of residence,[2] this definition prevents omissions and double counting so that migrant statistics can be compared and aggregated for different countries.

The relative contribution of natural increase and net migration to overall population growth varies greatly from one population to another. Dividing the world into two regions – the less developed countries (LDCs) and the more developed countries (MDCs) – Table 3.1 shows that net migration from LDCs to MDCs amounted to 2.6 million individuals annually between 2010 and 2015. This number represents a tiny (but negative) −3.4 per cent of overall population growth in LDCs (which was 78.4 million), but a large (and positive) 82.1 per cent of overall population growth in MDCs (which was 3.6 million). Indeed, LDCs are still, on average, in the process of 'demographic transition'[3] characterised by relatively high birth rates and rapid natural population growth, while MDCs are in the post-transition stage with birth rates at, or below, replacement level and close to zero natural population growth.

Figure 3.1 shows that these contrasted patterns have been evolving over the last 20 years. In the less developed regions, rates of natural increase are declining but they still remain high (respectively, 23.9 and 11.9 per 1,000 in the least developed countries and in the rest of the less developed regions in 2010–15) compared with net migration (respectively, 1.1 and −0.3 per thousand). Migration, therefore, has only a limited (but moderating) impact on overall population growth. In the more developed regions, natural increase is not only low but it is still declining (from 2.4 per 1,000 in 1990–95 to 0.8 in 2010–15), so that net migration (+2.0 per 1,000) brings a significant, positive contribution to overall population growth. In Europe, the situation is particularly exacerbated, with the natural increase becoming negative as of 2000 (−1.5 per 1,000 in 2000–05 and −0.8 in 2010–15) and net migration (reaching a maximum of +2.6 per 1,000 in 2005–10) being the only positive component of population growth.

The period of rapid population growth, which characterises the demographic transition (when birth rates are still high but deaths rates already low), often corresponds with an age of intense emigration (Hatton and Williamson 2006). This applies to nineteenth-century Europe and it has applied to many parts of the developing world since the mid-twentieth century.

Table 3.1 The components of population growth, by region 2012–13

Country/region	*World*	*Less developed regions*	*More developed regions*
A. Absolute numbers (in thousands)			
Population 1 July 2012	7,120,482.5	5,870,221.5	1,250,261.5
Births	139,121	125,078	13,973
Deaths	57,402	44,455	13,398
Natural growth	81,719	80,623	575
Net migration	0	–2,634	2,634
Total growth	81,719	77,989	3,209
Population 30 June 2013	7,202,201.5	5,948,210.5	1,253,470.5
B. Annual net migration as a percentage of			
Total population	0.00%	–0.04%	0.21%
Total growth	0.00%	–3.38%	82.08%

Source: United Nations 2015. *World population prospects. The 2012 revision*. Available online at: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm (accessed: 2 March 2015).



Figure 3.1 Rates of net migration and natural increase, by region and period

Source: United Nations 2015. *World population prospects. The 2012 revision.* Available online at: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm (accessed: 2 March 2015).

However, one should not infer from these average trends that net migration, on the one hand, and natural increase, on the other, vary *systematically* in opposite directions. It is not the case that rapid population growth in connection with high birth rates inevitably *causes* emigration. Conversely, demographic decline due to below replacement birth rates does not always *cause* immigration. There are, indeed, many exceptions. Just to pick a few examples: Italy and Moldova both have negative rates of natural increase in 2013 (respectively, −0.2 and −1.3 per 1,000), but the first has a positive rate of net migration and the second a negative rate (respectively, +6.4 and −9.3 per 1,000). In Italy, immigration compensates for the population decline, while in Moldova, emigration accentuates population decline. At the other end of the spectrum, both Saudi Arabia and Morocco have high rates of natural increases (respectively, +16.3 and +13.8), but their rate of net migration is, in one case, positive (Saudi Arabia, +2.1) and, in the other, negative (Morocco, −4.0) (UN 2015). In Saudi Arabia, immigration accentuates rapid population growth, while in Morocco emigration mitigates it.

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International migration and demographic transition in less developed regions

This section will show that international migration and demographic change can be linked in one single model. First, it will review the impact of international migration on demographic transition, and second, the consequences of demographic transition on international migration will be examined. It will, subsequently, present (but not formally demonstrate) two hypotheses on the interaction between international migration and demographic transition. First, there is a global demographic benefit from international migration in the sense that migration may have sped-up the process of demographic transition in the developing world. Second, the demographic transition is expected to transform the dominant pattern of international migration from a family-oriented to an individual-based one.

The impact of migration on demographic change in developing countries

Common sense says that moving an individual from one country to another does not change the total number of individuals on earth. This is certainly true at any moment in time. However, the common sense answer breaks down as soon as we shift from a transversal to longitudinal perspective. International migration does affect the reproduction of population over time. More precisely, one can argue that modern international migration has reduced the rate of population growth in the developing world, thereby bringing a contribution (however, tiny it might be) to containing rapid population growth globally (Fargues 2006; Beine *et al*. 2008).

The core argument can be set out in three points. First, the largest flows of recent international migration have been of the south-to-north type, that is, from countries with high birth rates to countries with low birth rates. Second, in countries of destination, migrants are exposed to models and practices that they gradually adopt for themselves, and that they can then transfer to populations left-behind in their countries of origin through social or ideational remittances (Levitt 1998). Third, some of the transferred models and practices are linked to patterns of family building, making international migrants conveyors of demographic change to non-migrant communities in their origin countries.

Norms that have a bearing on demography can be either direct dimensions of family building (such as age at marriage or birth control) or remote determinants of family building, in particular, the dissemination and lengthening of school education. Increasing school enrollment is, indeed, expected to reduce the birth rates through two distinct mechanisms: first, it raises the expected cost of any child brought into the world, thereby triggering a quantity for quality trade-off (Becker and Lewis 1973); second, girls' enrollment is a critical step towards women's empowerment and to their achieving roles other than that of wife or mother.

The argument that international migration contributes to lowering the birth rates in the origin countries of migrants was tested in three major sending countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA): Egypt, Morocco and Turkey. MENA migrants have two main destinations: the Gulf states and the West. Those who go to the Gulf find societies that are more traditional than that of the origin country. Patriarchal values and practices have in many ways been preserved by over-abundant oil money and by the rentier state, in particular as regards the status of women. The birth rates of Gulf nationals are much higher than those of foreign-nationals. They are also higher than the birth rates in relevant migrant origin countries.

By contrast, MENA migrants who go to the West find societies that have completed their demographic transition and that have lower birth rates than those left behind. Lower birth rates go in parallel with a higher status for women, in particular as regards economic participation and education, and with secularised societies.

If the ideational remittances hypothesis is true, then emigration will produce the opposite impact on the birth rates in the origin countries of migrants, according to where migrants from these countries go. Emigration to the Gulf is expected to slacken the decline of fertility in the origin country and emigration to the West should accelerate it. And this is actually just what we observe. Over the last five decades – which were decades of intense emigration – striking time correlations have been observed between birth rates and emigration, more precisely between birth rates and migrants' remittances.

In Morocco and Turkey, the correlation is negative. This does not allow any strong conclusion as it might be a simple coincidence between two trends one can observe in many countries: on the one hand, declining birth rates and, on the other, increasing migrant workers' remittances. In Egypt, the correlation is negative. Moreover, there is a most striking parallel between two time series that are completely independent from one another: migrant workers' remittances and birth rates. Figure 3.2 shows that from 1965 until 2012, each time more money has been available to Egyptian families through transfers from their expatriates, fertility has increased. Conversely, each time families were short of remittances, fertility declined.

A key intermediate variable appears to be the level of female education, which is the single most important determinant of the demographic transition in developing countries. School enrolment of girls was found to be positively correlated with emigration in Morocco and Turkey and negatively in Egypt. A notable feature is that, while men (still) migrate more than women, it is mostly through non-migrant women that the relationship between migration and demography operates.

As more migrants are moving from a high to a low birth rate environment than the other way around (migration to the West is bigger than migration to the Gulf), one can speak of the global demographic benefits of international migration. We have fewer people in the world thanks to the fact that international migration takes place.



Figure 3.2 Remittances and birth rates in Egypt 1960–2012

Source: Fargues 2011 (updated by the author).

The impact on migration of demographic change in developing countries

It is common to link migration with fertility. The usual approach is to link high emigration from developing countries to low fertility in developed countries. For example, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) states that: 'A decline in fertility and working-age populations in many developed countries is leading to a rising demand for workers from abroad to sustain national economies'.[4] According to this view, fertility in country A is just an exogenous factor of emigration from country B.

There is a different way to look at this question by focusing on the relationship between fertility and emigration within the same country. In what follows, we will see how the decline of fertility in any country in the course of its demographic transition is linked to emigration from this country.

Birth rates have steadily declined in the developing world in recent decades. Declining birth rates are expected to relax pressure on the labour market, but only 20 to 25 years later, when smaller birth cohorts reach employment age. In the meantime, young adults will be subjected to rising demographic competition for scarce resources: for employment and housing, but also for symbolic recognition. Possible outcomes will be of the exit-or-voice type (Hirschman 1970). Growing numbers of frustrated young adults might result in anything from increased migratory pressures to social and political protest.

In fact, it is widely acknowledged that the youth bulge observed in the course of demographic transition is often accompanied by an increase in emigration. There is a particular moment of the demographic transition that seems propitious to large-scale migration: it is when, as a result of a sustained decline in the birth rates, the size of new-born cohorts shrinks in absolute numbers, translating into a bulge of young adult ages in relative numbers. A time coincidence between mass emigration and the appearance of a 'youth bulge' on age pyramids has been convincingly shown by Hatton and Williamson (2006).

What has remained unnoticed, however, is another aspect of demographic change: namely, that drops in fertility generate a dramatic shift in the profile of migrants. This shift is produced by the combination of two trends. The first trend is a remarkable delay in family building over the last decades in many parts of the developing world. Age at marriage has increased dramatically and the number of children being born has decreased. Young adults are at an exceptional moment in demographic history. Their fertility is low (and is expected to remain low) so that they no longer have to support numerous children. However, their mothers had high fertility so that they have numerous siblings to support the elderly. Young adults today are much freer, then, from traditional family constraints. There is unprecedented personal freedom of movement and an unprecedented availability to take risks among young adults today. The second trend is the remarkable stability of the age at international migration over time and space. As far as migration statistics go back in time, IM has proved to take place on average at 25 years (a fact that no theory has tried to explain).

As a result of these two trends – delayed family building but stable age at migration – an outstanding shift is taking place in the individual situation of migrants, as well as in their motivation for migrating (Table 3.2). Until recently, migrants usually had a family left behind and their migration was motivated by the need to feed their family and to educate their children. Remitting money was the objective of migration; in fact, remittances were the cause of migration rather than its consequence. Migrants were altruistic in the sense of priority given to remittances. Today, migrants are increasingly single individuals with no spouse and no children; therefore, their goal is individualistic. They may continue to remit savings to their country of origin, but it is increasingly to prepare for their own return or to

Table 3.2 Number of children born to male migrants according to the stage of demographic transition

Stage of demographic transition	*Pre-transition*	*Transition 1*	*Transition 2*	*Post-transition*
Children already born at the time of migration	2.5	1.9	1.2	0.6
Children still to be born after migration	4	3.4	1.4	1
Total	6.5	5.3	2.6	1.6

Source: Author's calculation using UN age specific fertility patterns. Available online at: http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/worldfertility2007/WorldFertilityPatterns%202007_UpdatedData.xls (accessed: 19 January 2015).

manage a safety net for themselves. Remittances become more an investment rather than a consumption tool.

Two conclusions can be drawn from what precedes. First, migrants are not isolated individuals. They share public and sometimes private spaces with the host society. They are exposed to ideas and practices of natives that they progressively make their own and transmit to communities remaining in the origin countries. Some of the transmitted ideas are related to the condition of women – to their education and to their participation in economic activities – are now crucial drivers of demographic transition. The more migrants integrate into the host society, the more powerful ideational remittances will be. A first policy conclusion is that integrating migrants well in the destination country means development in the origin country.

Second, migrants are not only motivated by altruistic goals. With the shift from high to low birth rates in the sending countries, a shift from a migrant with a family left behind to a single individual migrant is taking place. Self-achievement through mobility is gradually replacing the need to feed a migrant's family in the origin country. In addition to money, migration brings knowledge. Remittances have rightly been regarded by development agencies as a major source of external income that can be mobilised for development, and this, a few years ago, inspired a slogan of the World Bank: 'creating a climate favourable to flows of investment'. In order to foster development through knowledge acquired with migration and through ideational remittances, a timely slogan might be 'creating a climate favourable to flows of ideas'. However, this might be a greater challenge. While all states welcome money, not all of them are ready to open their doors to ideas.

High immigration and low fertility in the post-transitional demography of the most advanced countries

The more developed regions of the world have now finished their demographic transition. Low fertility combined with low mortality results in low rates of natural population increase or either a slightly positive (for example, the USA) or slightly negative (for example, Russia) one. However, the relative share of international migration in overall population growth is high.

A new pattern of population replacement

In order to assess the role of international migration, it is useful to briefly introduce the notion of reproduction in demography. This means comparing the amount of children of a female birth cohort at age A to the amount of children of the cohort of their mothers at the same age A. One-to-one reproduction is attained when both cohorts have the same number of children and their ratio equals one. Higher reproduction levels translate in a ratio greater

than one and low reproduction levels in a ratio smaller than one. More precisely, the net reproduction rate (R) is the number of daughters that would be born to an average woman exposed through her lifetime to the age-specific fertility and mortality rates of a given year. At birth (age = 0), R(0) is a simple measurement of fertility. At any other age a, R(a) combines fertility with mortality. In a period when mortality is declining and the probability of the survival of daughters is higher than that of mothers, R(a) > R(0).

In order to depart from the purely biological view of reproduction that has prevailed in demography and to incorporate migration, Wilson *et al*. (2013) have designed a new index, the 'overall replacement ratio' (ORR) that is inspired from the classical net reproduction rate. ORR is the ratio of women aged a enumerated in the resident population at time t, to women aged a enumerated at time (t-m), where m is the mean age at childbearing. The denominator includes the net effect of migration between times (t-m) and the whole purpose is to encompass, in one index of demographic replacement, the cumulative effect of international migration and natural increase. The concept of population replacement migration 'asks whether immigration can inflate the population size in a cohort as it ages, so that it eventually compensates for the difference between the observed number of births and the hypothetical number of births that would have occurred if fertility reached replacement level' (Wilson *et al*. 2013: 132).

Computing ORR by birth cohort, from 1975 to 1995, and by age, from 0 (birth) to the age reached by the cohort in 2010 (aged between 15 for birth cohort in 1995 and 35 years for birth cohort in 1975), authors have found the following results for the EU15 member states:

- The more recent the cohort the lower the replacement at every age as a result of persisting below-replacement fertility;
- The older the age, the higher the replacement for every cohort, as a result of net immigration;
- For cohorts born after 1985, it is unlikely that replacement will reach one at any age: current levels of immigration do not fully make up for low levels of fertility

(Wilson et al. 2013).

The fact that high immigration fully or partly compensates for low fertility in assuring population replacement raises a question of identity. Indeed, while populations of local origin are shrinking, the immigrants they receive are increasingly coming from different cultural areas.

During the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century, immigrants received by Western countries came from the West itself. In Europe, most international migration was intra-European. In the United States, migrants came mainly from Europe, 91.3 per cent of all migrants arrived in the nineteenth century. A striking reversal occurred though in the last decades: 56 per cent of migrants received by the 28 EU member states in 2002 to 2007 and 89 per cent of those received by the USA in 1970 to 2007 came from non-European countries (author's calculation based on US Bureau of the Census and Eurostat data). While these are simple facts, their interpretation is a matter of contention.

An identity shift?

Much has been made of changes brought to Western societies by growing immigration from the non-Western world. Some scholars have interpreted the ongoing movement as a gradual replacement of a native population by an immigrant one; others instead, have stressed complementarities between the two population groups. Others still, have questioned

the very distinction between two populations, one 'native' and one 'of foreign origin'. Underlying these three perspectives, there is the same interest in whether and how migration challenges identity in host societies.

According to the first group of scholars, current patterns of below-replacement fertility in Europe and Northern America combined with high rates of immigration from other parts of the world would result in a durable demographic shift. This would be characterised by shrinking native populations – or populations of European-ancestry in the case of the US – and growing non-Western foreign origin populations. This process would in turn generate a cultural shift so that the populations of Western countries increasingly resemble those of the origin countries of migrants (Huntington 2004; Coleman 2006, 2009).

Founding his argument on demographic projections of European countries, Coleman states that: 'the ancestry of some national populations is being radically and permanently altered by high levels of immigration of persons from remote geographic origins' (2006: 401) and 'the processes resulting from low fertility combined with high immigration…are changing the composition of national populations and thereby the culture, physical appearance, social experiences and self-perceived identities of the inhabitants of European nations' (Ibid.: 402).

Under the current trends of migration and fertility, looking separately at the indigenous and the first- and second-generation foreign-born population, we would see the following changes between 2000 and 2050: the proportion of non-Western population in England and Wales would grow from 8.7 per cent to 24.5 per cent, in Denmark from 6.0 per cent to 11.5 per cent, in Germany from 6.6 per cent to 18.2 per cent, in the Netherlands from 8.9 per cent to 16.5 per cent and in Norway from 3.4 per cent to 14.3 per cent. In 2050 in Britain, 50 per cent of all births will be of minority origin, which means that, with the passing of time, native Britons are destined to become a minority in their own island (Coleman 2006). The US Census Bureau uses the same approach assuming that population groups remain distinct in their projections of the population by race in the US from 2010 to 2050. For example, it estimates that the 'Hispanic' (migrants originating in Latin and South America) population there will rise from 16.0 per cent to 30.2 per cent by 2050 (USCIS).

Local, sub-national projections by ethnicity are not available for Europe, but Coleman mentions that, by 2001, 40 per cent of London's inhabitants were already of non-British



Figure 3.3 Percentage of persons of non-Western origin in European countries according to ethnic projections 2000–50

Source: Coleman 2006.

ethnic origin. He also notes that, unlike the UK, most European countries do not provide ethnic classifications. Therefore, studies using citizenship-based classifications progressively underestimate the foreign origin population, as naturalisation statistically reduces the number of people of foreign origin 'compared with more enduring ethnic or racial criteria' (Ibid.: 408).

Slowly but inexorably, the balance would shift in favour of non-European populations in European countries. Changes underway are not violent, but their 'effects in the long run may eclipse anything that has gone before, in the degree of replacement, in the geographic remoteness of origins, and in the speed of change' (Ibid.: 421). It must be noted that the ongoing transition is not a universal process but one which is limited to the developed world whose population is destined to 'resemble more that of the developing world, but not conversely' (Ibid.: 428). Finally, the process of 'ethnic replacement' has a powerful bearing on social cohesion as populations of foreign origin do not share the values and identity of natives and their 'distinct physical appearance would reinforce that discontinuity' (Ibid.: 426).

Playing complementarities

Demography, however, is not only a question of population numbers but also of age pyramids. Preserving the generational contract has long been an argument for pronatalist policies and, in the face of their failure, for pro-immigration policies. In the 1950s, French demographer Alfred Sauvy had already stressed that immigrants and natives have complementary age pyramids and population dynamics (Sauvy 1952). Natives have a rapidly ageing population, while immigrants have a younger age structure and higher fertility. As a result, the two groups have contrasting patterns of inter-generational transfers. Among ageing natives, transfers are predominantly from active adults to retired older people (pensions and health care), while among immigrants, they are predominantly from active adults to pre-school or school-age children (cost of education).



Figure 3.4 Population in the Netherlands by age and origin mid-2014

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Den Haag/Heerlen 18 December 2014

In countries where the welfare state dominates, immigrants and natives are not two disconnected groups, but they are tied by a single social security system that organises social transfers at the national level. Therefore, inter-generational transfers from active to dependent individuals result in asymmetric inter-ethnic transfers: schematically, native adults over-transfer to young immigrants, while immigrant adults over-transfer to old natives. The stratification of society along the lines of age groups intertwines with ethnic stratification.

To make things still more asymmetric, social transfers to dependent age groups, old persons and children, have neither the same nature nor the same magnitude. Monetary transfers to the old are regarded as expenses and those to children as investments and, with the growth in life expectancy, the former have a much greater magnitude than the latter. This was a view expressed in the 1980s about California, where retired and well-educated Anglo-Saxons would, it was believed, be increasingly supported by young less educated Latinos, expected at that time to form 70 per cent of the Californian labour force by 2030. This evolution may deteriorate and lead to an open ethnic conflict or to a situation of mutual benefit if public policies of investment in education and affirmative action are adopted, fostering the emergence of an assertive Mexican-American middle class in the case of California (Hayes-Bautista *et al.* 1988).

Two distinct populations or one new population?

However different their conclusions may be, both approaches posit that ethnic distinctions will stay from one generation to the other and that there are two distinct populations that largely reproduce themselves in isolation. This overlooks the role of intermarriage in constructing a new population out of a variety of old ones. Immigration and the arrival of foreigners is an undisputable reality, but the notion that it must necessarily result in something such as a foreign-origin population juxtaposed with the native population is a simple logical error (Le Bras 1997).

Exogamy rapidly results in offspring with blurred origins. Intermarriages are few among first-generation migrants, but they become more frequent for second-generation migrants and tend to be the rule, not the exception, for subsequent generations. Children of mixed parentage are, therefore, a normal product of migration. How should they be classified: as persons of foreign-origin or as natives? At what level will they be classified as foreign or native – first-generation or second-generation?

The situation becomes extremely complex with the passing of generations. In the case of France with its nationality law, Le Bras identifies 255 possible situations for third-generation migrants. The 255 possibilities do not take into account that someone can belong to a generation from his mother's side and to another one from his father's, and that this applies to each of his/her two parents, four grandparents, eight great-grandparents, etc. Classifying individuals into foreign-origin versus natives cuts arbitrarily into a continuum. There are not two populations, one of local- and the other of foreign-origin, but one population made of individuals presenting an almost infinite number of possible combinations in terms of origins.

By way of conclusion: migration in a time of demographic utopia

Historians have found a recurrent association between mass migration and demographic transitions. The youth bulge generations, those born in the 1980s when fertility was still close to its climax and mortality already low, are more inclined to migrate than those who

either precede or follow them. This is how, over the last half of a century, international migration has come to be dominated by flows from the rapidly growing populations of the Global South towards the slowly growing Global North. There were at the same time flows from poor to rich countries. One can assume that migrants will continue to search out better lives for themselves and flow to countries wealthier than their own. What would happen then, should the demographic utopia become a reality, if long-range demographic projections that have all countries converging on a zero rate of natural population increase come true? Net migration would then be the only factor differentiating growing and declining populations. Migrant receiving, that is, the rich, countries would have a positive rate of overall population growth and migrant sending, whereas the poor countries would have a negative rate. The world we know today, in which poor countries grow demographically faster than rich countries, would be turned upside down.

Endnotes

1 It has to be noted that international migration is only a tiny part of cross border mobility. While the number of people crossing national boundaries probably runs into the billions every year, most of them are mere travellers who return to their country of origin.

2 According to the United Nations, 'a person is considered to be a resident in a country if the person: (a) has lived for most of the past year (12 months) in that country or (b) has lived in that country for a shorter period and intends to return within 12 months to live in that country' (UN 1998: 17). While this definition is unambiguous from a logical point of view (there can be only one country where a person has lived more than in others), it is sociologically debatable (migrants' lives are often described as 'transnational', that is, shared between two or more different countries.

3 The demographic transition is the universal, historical shift of all human populations from a pre-transition equilibrium where birth and death rates are both high, to a post-transition equilibrium where they are both low. Because death rates decline before birth rates, the demographic transition is characterised by high rates of natural increase.

4 Available online at: http://web.lb.unfpa.org/pds/migration.htm (accessed: 19 January 2015).

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